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INTRODUCTION
Auditors play an important role in assuring the production and issue of high-quality financial reports. The question of whether auditors effectively play this role in ensuring credible accounting information has received episodic attention over time. The spate of collapses in the early millennium years exemplified by the Enron bankruptcy in 2001 and the related collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2002 triggered a bout of criticism of Big 4 audit firms, their processes and the quality of the audits being performed by them (Francis, 2004) . These criticisms were particularly jarring given the traditional perceptions of the high quality of audits performed by large firms (Lam and Chang, 1994) .
That perception is clearly evident in literature relating to audit quality dating back over a span of at least three decades. It appears to have been a long held view that large audit firms provide higher quality audits and offer greater credibility to clients" financial statements than small audit firms (Lennox, 1999) . This aura of quality has been argued to stem not just from the technical expertise and processes brought to bear by larger firms, but also because large firms enjoy better reputations, have higher brand equity and are likely to be highly concerned to protect these (DeAngelo, 1981) . In addition, larger audit firms have generally been viewed as being more independent and being seen to be more independent of their clients (Dopuch, 1984) .
Of course, tensions associated with the provision of quality services and the maintenance of independence do exist and have been duly noted in the literature. The impact of the bundling of audit and non audit services on independence, effectiveness and quality represents an example of a concern persistently manifested in the literature over time. Other commonly raised concerns have related to factors such as fee structures, length of relationship and turnover of engagement partners (Healy and Lys, 1986; Sabri, 1993; and Chen et. al 2005) .
Without calling the significance of these matters into question, it is arguable that other factors might also wield substantial influence on the quality of the outcomes achieved by auditors, large or small. One such phenomenon might be labelled "technical competence". A general assumption in the literature appears to be that this is a given in the context of the execution of a financial statement audit -particularly when the work is undertaken by a global brand name provider.
This assumption may be very strongly founded on average. Yet in the domain of financial reporting there exist key inflection points where an accumulation of prior technical expertise is either rendered redundant or at least degraded substantially in its worth. A notable trigger point for this form of disruption is the transition from one regulatory regime or framework to another.
This type of regime transition disruption event is well exemplified by the decision on the part of a particular jurisdiction to transition from pre-existing indigenous GAAP to a reporting framework compliant with international financial reporting standards (IFRS). The extent of this disruption may be more profound in jurisdictions which at the time of transition are still in the process of rapid development and do not enjoy the depth of human capital or regulatory institutions available to more fully developed jurisdictions.
In light of this, the decision by Malaysia to adopt the new and revised financial reporting standards (FRS) modelled tightly on IFRS (though with some variations applicable in the transition phase) represents an interesting opportunity for research into the impact of expertise disruption on audit quality. The new suite of standards effective from 1 January 2006, contain the seeds of great challenges for auditors of financial reports. In particular, a number of the new internationally compliant standards are substantially more complex in their configuration, in the nature and structure of reporting processes and disclosures that they require and consequently on the demands associated with the production of audit services under their aegis (Carlin & Finch, 2008) .
The new standards relating to asset impairment represent an excellent case in point. Preparation of reports compliant with the requirements of IAS 36 Impairment of Assets (or Malaysian equivalent FRS 136) requires the application of a tightly woven knit of principles drawn from forecasting, measurement and valuation theory, under conditions of inherent uncertainty. The result, especially when applied to the context of an unruly asset class such as goodwill can be highly complex and potentially controversial.
Consequently, this study focuses on evidence relating to the apparent quality of financial statement audits in the context of the transition to a new, complex regime. Specifically, the degree of technical compliance with the disclosure requirements of FRS 136 by a sample of large Malaysian listed companies is used as a proxy for audit quality in relation to the complex provisions of the IFRS impairment testing regime.
In investigating this theme, the remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a brief review of some pertinent prior research literature. Section 3 sets out details of the sample, data and methodology employed. Section 4 sets out a discussion of key findings results, while section 5 contains some conclusions and suggests some potential avenues for further research.
LITERTURE REVIEW
Audit quality can be defined as the probability that an error or irregularity is detected (DeAngelo, 1981) and the willingness to report any material manipulation or misstatements that will increase the material uncertainties or/and going concern problems (Bradshaw et al., 2001) . In other words, high audit quality is associated with an absence of material omissions or misstatements in financial statements (Palmrose, 1988) .
Within the extant literature on the subject, it has been commonplace to view audit firm size as a surrogate for audit quality. It has often been assumed that larger audit firms incur costs to develop a reputation for adding value to the audit and are better able to detect and reveal management"s errors or irregularities in financial reporting (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1993) . DeAngelo (1981) suggested that large auditors have more reason to issue accurate reports because they have more valuable reputations and the auditor has a greater reputation to lose if their clients misreport. This theme was later developed as the "at risk quasi rent" explanation, pursuant to which the more extensive potential economic loss exposures faced by large audit firms provide a strong motivational framework for quality assurance and enhancement (Francis and Wilson 1988 ).
An array of empirical evidence ostensibly consistent with the theoretical explanations discussed above exists. For example, Becker et al. (1998) suggests that large audit firm are able to detect earnings management because of their advanced knowledge and act to control opportunistic earnings management to protect their reputation. This is said to be demonstrated by the observation that clients of large audit firms exhibit lower discretionary accruals than those of other audit firm clients.
Capital market studies have found that the stock market reacts more positively when a company switches to a large audit firms and report higher earnings response coefficients for clients of large audit firms compared to clients of non-large audit firms (Nichols and Smith, 1983; Eichenseher et al., 1989; Teoh and Wong, 1993) . Other studies on the market reaction to the initial public offerings of stocks, reveals that the trading volume on the first trading day is significantly larger for Big Eight clients than for those of non-Big Eight firms (Jang and Lin, 1993) . A range of studies have also suggested that companies undergoing IPOs experience less under-pricing when they hire large audit firms (e.g; Balvers et al., 1988; Firth and Smith, 1992) The evidence above has been widely interpreted as supporting the notion that auditor size is a robust surrogate for audit quality. However, at least in the minds of some authors, events such as the bankruptcy of Enron and the related collapse of Arthur Anderson have undermined confidence in the assertion that large audit firms are associated with higher audit quality. Thus, Fuerman (2003) examined evidence which might point to a conclusion of quality differentiation between Big Six auditors. While the results of that study suggested that Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and Price Waterhouse each produced higher quality auditors compared to non-Big Six firms, the same conclusion was not supported with regard to Arthur Andersen.
By way of contrast, empirical research by Eisenberg and Macey (2003) , drawing upon data relating to earnings restatements finds no evidence of audit quality differentials among large auditors 1 . Other recent research has generated similar conclusions (e.g; Tilis, 2005) also supports the assertion. Thus while the preponderance of view within the audit quality literature appears to continue to support the proposition that the quality of audits undertaken by large firms exceeds that of audits carried out by smaller firms, there is little evidence strongly supportive of quality differentials between large firms.
In interpreting the audit quality literature and understanding its significance, it is important to recognise that the measurement of quality has both a relative and an absolute dimension. The estimation of audit quality on a relative basis tends to proceed via a process of comparing observed values for some posited proxy for quality between audit firms, while attempts to determine the absolute quality of an audit tend to examine the audit process itself, against unique engagement specific benchmarks.
The latter approach is costly, usually requiring researchers to be embedded with audit teams as they undertake their work, or have direct access to audit working papers or peer review processes undertaken in relation to engagement work. There are published examples of such work (e.g; Colbert & Murray, 1998) , but these are comparatively rare. On the other hand, work focused on relative measures of audit quality (via proxy), including literature citing evidence of fee differentials, litigation occurrence and resolution, earnings forecast accuracy, earnings response coefficients -as examples, are more frequently represented in the published literature (e.g; Behn & Choi, 2008; Lam & Chang, 1994; Palmrose, 1998; Teoh & Wong, 1993) .
One consequence of the manner in which the question of audit quality has predominantly been dealt with in the extant literature may have been a failure to focus on situations where the most pertinent questions relating to quality relate not to the quality of one firm"s offering versus another"s, but rather as to the capacity to deliver an appropriate level of baseline assurance.
As argued above, periods of regulatory transition represent risk inflexion points where skill sets and approaches to the conduct of work previously accumulated may be deeply diminished in their value. The adoption of IFRS is a case in point, and as noted, a particularly challenging element of the IFRS framework is that element of it which deals with the asset impairment phenomenon, especially as it pertains to goodwill.
The need to adopt the IFRS framework for measuring and reporting on goodwill represents a very substantial challenge to Malaysian reporting entities. Most entities will be impacted by the more prescriptive impairment test under FRS 136. The requirement to perform annual impairment testing for goodwill, in addition to the requirement to test when there exists indication of impairment, is likely to prove a very significant technical test for many entities. Under IFRS, reporting entities also need to deal with significantly expanded disclosure requirements in particular in relation to recoverable amount and impairment testing, including information about key assumptions.
Whether the value of goodwill has been impaired in a given year is determined through a process of comparing estimates of the recoverable amount of portfolios of assets (known as cash generating units -or CGUs) with the book value ascribed to those assets. Paragraph 18 of FRS 136 -Impairment of Assets, defines recoverable amount as the higher of an asset"s or a cash generating unit (CGU)"s fair value less costs to sell and its value in use. This provides reporting entities with a choice between fair value and value in use as a basis for recoverable amount estimation, which choice carries substantial implications for the types of disclosures required by the entity 2 . In Malaysia"s case, the absence of active and liquid markets for many types of assets valuation leads to a natural tendency on the part of reporting entities to adopt the value in used method as the dominant means of determining the recoverable amount. This then drives a series of disclosure requirements consequent on that choice. Paragraph 134 (d) of FRS 136 -Impairment of Assets, states that the disclosure requirements if the unit"s (group of units") recoverable amount is based on value in use are;
i. a description of each key assumption on which management has based its cash flow projections for the period covered by the most recent budgets/forecasts. Key assumptions are those to which the unit"s (group of units") recoverable amount is most sensitive 3 ; ii. a description of management"s approach to determining the value(s) assigned to each key assumption, whether those value(s) reflect past experience or, if appropriate, are consistent with external sources of information, and, if not, how and why they differ from past experience or external sources of information 4 ; iii. the period over which management has projected cash flows based on financial budgets/forecasts approved by management and, when a period greater than five years is used for a cash-generating unit (group of units), an explanation of why that longer period is justified 5 ; iv.
the growth rate used to extrapolate cash flow projections beyond the period covered by the most recent budgets/forecasts, and the justification for using any growth rate that exceeds the long-term average growth rate for the products, industries, or country or countries in which the entity operates, or for the market to which the unit (group of units) is dedicated 6 ; and v. the discount rate(s) applied to the cash flow projections 7
In implementing the new standard for goodwill, companies need to deal with significantly expanded disclosure requirements in particular in relation to recoverable amount, impairment and information about key assumptions adopted in the value simulation process. This has not changed the format of information recognized in the balance sheet but has materially changed the information required in the notes to the accounts.
From an auditor"s perspective, the new IFRS requirements drive increases in disclosure and, therefore, required effort in the conduct of the audit (Hoogendoorn, 2006) . However, it is not clear that enhanced disclosure challenges, particularly those with greatest impact in the notes to the accounts, are universally well dealt with in the context of financial statement audits.
The results of a recent study by Libby et al. (2006) indicate a far higher level of sensitivity on the part of Big 4 audit firm partners to adjustments impacting the balance sheet and or profit and loss statements than those whose impact was limited to the notes only. In other words, auditors appear more willing to tolerate errors and discrepancies in note form disclosures than in recognized numbers on the primary financial statements. If these results are generalisable beyond the setting in which they were generated, then they suggest that the implementation of FRS 136, replete as it is with complex note form disclosure requirements, represents a useful focal point for research which may yield interesting insights into audit quality in the face of change and complexity.
Specifically, the highly detailed disclosure requirements set out in FRS 136 present an opportunity to interrogate the level of compliance and disclosure quality exhibited by reporting entities -and by extension, yield insights into the quality of the oversight provided in relation to the resulting financial statements by auditors.
For the purposes of this study, a number of matters are of particular interest. First, the fact that goodwill acquired in a business combination is required to be allocated to cash generating units (CGUs) in order to be tested for impairment. Second, the fact that the adoption of a value in use approach to the estimation of CGU recoverable amount requires the application of appropriate discount rates as an integral element of the cashflow modelling central to the valuation exercise under the value in use approach. Third, that the same modelling exercise also requires the application of growth rate assumptions. Each of these elements is subject to technically precise disclosure requirements and, as is becoming evident from a growing raft of evidence, potential gaming (Ramanna & Watts, 2007; Zhang & Zhang, 2007) .
The importance of the technical processes pursuant to which goodwill impairment testing transpires has been explored in a range of previous literature (e.g Lonergan, 2007) . Prior research has suggested that one key challenge faced in the context of FRS 136 is the manner in which goodwill is allocated between CGUs for the purposes of impairment testing. A particular risk relating to this process is known as the CGU aggregation problem , where too few CGUs are defined and have goodwill allocated to them. This induces the risk that impairment charges which should occur are avoided, or at least inappropriately delayed. 8 The selection of appropriate discount and growth rates and the generation of appropriate disclosures in relation to these choices also represent matters of material concern. Arguably, the nature of choices made by reporting entities, the level of their compliance with the precepts of FRS 136 and the quality of disclosures made pursuant to that standard all convey evidence pertinent to an assessment of the quality of audit oversight tendered in conditions of complexity and change. The remainder of the paper is given over to a discussion of the methodology employed with a view to gleaning relevant insights, the results of the application of that methodology and the conclusions derived there from.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
All reporting entities with reporting dares commencing on or after 1 January 2006 are required to comply with FRS 136"s requirements. Thus, 2006 represents the first reporting period for Malaysian companies during which it was mandatory to apply FRS 136. The commencing sample for the research was the 100 constituent firms which comprised the FTSE 9 Bursa Malaysia Index as at 2006.
However, it was necessary to exclude a substantial number of these firms from the final research sample. Some 36 companies were excluded as not having goodwill as an element of their asset base in their 2006 consolidated financial statements. A further 28 companies were excluded by reason of having a reporting date other than 31 December 10 Another 2 companies were excluded because they were audited by non-Big 4 auditors. Details of the 34 companies comprising the final research samples, their market capitalization and the value of their goodwill balances are set out in Appendix A. The research sample represented 35.2% of FTSE Bursa Malaysia total market capitalization as at the conclusion of December 2006.
To facilitate analysis of the final research sample, the thirty four companies were divided into six groups comprising organizations with related principal lines of business. At the date of sampling, the thirty four companies included in the final sample controlled assets valued at RM 572,393 million, which included goodwill of RM 31,202 million. An overview of the research sample broken down by assigned sector, the ringgit Malaysia value of company assets within the sector, and the ringgit Malaysia value of goodwill for each sector is shown in Table 1 , below. Table 3 shows the key descriptive statistics for the companies in the research sample classified by auditor. On average, Ernst & Young clients were smaller (as measured by market capitalisation) compared to clients of other Big 4 auditors. However, it was clients of PWC which on average had the highest levels of goodwill relative to assets. In consequence it is posited that the potential earnings sensitivity of PWC clients to impairment losses on goodwill write downs was on average higher than for clients of other Big 4 audit firms included in the sample. Key descriptive statistics pertaining to the firms in the research sample, sorted by audit firm identity are set out in Table 3 , below. A focal question in this study is the extent to which the clients of large audit firms strictly adhere to complex technical provisions of a new reporting standard. As discussed in section 2, above, there are three key issues under FRS 136 -Impairment of Assets which are of potential interest and are capable of empirical investigation. These are, CGU structure, discount rate levels and disclosures and growth rate levels and disclosures.
Consistent with , six analytical structures were applied to the data. First, companies in the research sample were sorted by audit firm according to the choice of method employed in estimating the recoverable amount of CGU assets. These allowable choices of method include a value in use approach to recoverable amount estimation, a fair value approach or a combination of these two (that is, the use of value in use in some CGUs and the recourse to fair values in others). This data assisted with the development of insight into the level of compliance with basic disclosure requirements set out in FRS 136.
Second, the companies in the research sample were sorted by audit firm, according to whether they allocate all the value of goodwill to the CGUs, for the purpose of impairment testing or whether there is no meaningful information indicate that how or if the value of goodwill being allocate to CGUs. It is a basic requirement of FRS 136 that all goodwill be allocated to CGUs and that adequate disclosures be made allowing financial statement users to reconcile between the headline value ascribed to goodwill on balance sheet and the subcomponents of that balance split between CGUs. This data assisted with the development of insight into the level of compliance with basic disclosure requirements set out in FRS 136.
Third, the companies in the research sample were sorted by audit firm according to the relationship between the number of industry segments they defined for reporting purposes and the number of CGUs defined for the purposes of goodwill impairment testing. This data provides evidence related to the likelihood of CGU aggregation behaviour on the part of reporting entities.
Fourth, a CGU to business segment ratio was calculated for each of the sample firms, the results being displayed according to audit firm identity. This analysis builds upon the procedure described in step three (above) and also goes to the likelihood of CGU aggregation behaviour among reporting entities.
Fifth, the companies in the research sample were sorted by audit firm according to the disclosure quality of discount rates used in the impairment testing process. A multi classification taxonomy for data categorisation was applied, comprising four groupings. These were;
1. "no effective disclosure"; 2. "range of discount rates" (where a firm stipulated that the discount rates employed laid within a disclosed range but did not link any particular discount rate to any particular CGU); 3. "single explicit discount rate" (where a single rate was used to discount the cash flows of all defined CGUs); and 4. "multiple explicit discount rates" (where a unique rate was used to discount the cashflows in each different CGU).
Allocation of a company to the first category signified that the company provided inadequate disclosure regarding the discount rate and in consequence provided no meaningful information for external analysts relating to the impairment testing process. Companies in this category clearly breached a key element of the disclosure requirements stipulated under FRS 136.
Firms categorised as falling within the second category, "range of discount rates", provided a degree of information regarding the process of impairment testing but given the lack of specificity of this data, it is questionable whether disclosure of this sort meets the requirements or objectives of FRS 136.
Companies in the third category i.e. "single explicit discount rate" disclosed the application of a single discount rate for recoverable amount modelling in each of their CGUs. While this treatment leaves financial statement users in no doubt as to the rate applied to the key task of future cashflow discounting, it nonetheless raises questions in relation to the appropriateness of the rates employed by these entities, given the need to shape discount rates to the risk characteristics of CGUs, and the likelihood that risk varies between CGUs.
Finally, companies in the fourth categories appeared to fully comply with the requirements of FRS 136 in relation to discount rates by disclosing unique rates applicable to each of their various CGUs. This form of disclosure fully complies with the requirements of the standard, but also provides a higher assurance of process quality through an explicit matching of applied rates to the individual risk characteristics of defined CGUs.
A very similar taxonomy was adopted as the means of classifying growth assumption disclosures made by firms in the research sample. Companies in the sample were allocated between four categories i.e. "multiple growth rates and periods for each CGU", "single growth rate and period for all CGUs", "partial disclosure only" or "no effective disclosure". The results of the analysis are reported in section four.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The basic question contemplated in this paper relates to the degree to which technical expertise survives periods of material regulatory inflexion sufficiently to underpin quality financial reporting outcomes. The onset of change in regulatory arrangements impacts not only preparers but also auditors of financial statements. Consequently, the initial change period represents an ideal moment at which to interrogate the content of financial statements drawn up under new and complex standards, with a view to gaining insight into the quality of oversight offered by the audit profession. The data in Table 4 represents an initial entrée into this journey, by setting out the frequency of companies" choice of method in estimating the recoverable amount of CGUs, a basic disclosure requirement under FRS 136. (Fah, 2006) . Second, nine of 34 companies (in excess of a quarter of the research sample) did not disclose any details of the method they used in determining the recoverable amount 12 of CGU assets.
In some cases the explanation for this may be that goodwill though present on the balance sheet, represents an immaterial balance 13 . On the whole however, the value of goodwill as a proportion of the total asset base of the non disclosing entities was material, leaving no obvious justification for the lack of transparency on this basic matter.
Further, reporting entities audited by each of Deloitte, Ernst & Young and KPMG failed this basic point of compliance, only PWC clients uniformly adhering to the requirement to disclose the method used to determine CGU recoverable amount. Given the limited sample of data available for review however, it would appear premature on this basis alone to claim any distinction between the level of oversight offered by PWC as against the level of oversight offered by the other large firms.
Having undertaken this basic level review, the next stage of the analysis employed comprised the construction of a comparison between the total goodwill value reported by each sample firm with the amount of goodwill allocated to CGUs by each firm. This data is set out in Table 5 , below. 12 It is clearly shown that these companies breach of FRS 136 -Impairment of Assets due to failure to disclose the information regarding the method employed to determined recoverable amount.
13
There were three of nine non disclosing firms where a plausible "immateriality" argument might be put. Again, substantial non compliance with a basic (and not particularly technically onerous) requirement of FRS 136 is clearly evident. Whilst 19 of 34 firms in the final research sample did produce disclosures which demonstrated full reconciliation between the quantum of balance sheet reported goodwill and the amount disclosed as having been allocated between the various CGUs defined by each, the remaining 15 (44%) failed to do so.
Number of companies
There is some possibility that 10 15 of these 15 companies may have taken the view that they had no need to comply with the requirement to disclose the amount of goodwill allocated to each CGU by reason of the low materiality of goodwill on their balance sheets relative to total assets. However, this view is likely to have been erroneous given that the standard clearly stipulates that the relevant materiality benchmark is total intangible assets, not total assets 16 .
Irrespective, there could be no shadow of a doubt that there was not even the possibility of confusion on this point in the case of the 5 17 other companies which failed to provide this basic disclosure. Again, there is little evidence strongly consistent with cross sectional compliance variation according to audit firm identity, the better view of the evidence being that slipshod practices manifested on a frequent basis without apparent regard to audit firm identity.
The next phase of the analysis was based on the preparation of evidence pertaining to the goodwill aggregation problem. Recall that a concern raised in prior literature on IFRS based impairment testing is the "aggregation problem" where firms generate an internal "portfolio diversification" effect by combining imperfectly correlated 14 Non-compliant companies were those who failed to allocate any goodwill to CGUs. Paragraph 80 of FRS 136 Impairment of Assets requires that "For the purpose of impairment testing, goodwill shall be allocated to each of the acquirer"s cash-generating units, or groups of cash generating units, that are expected to benefit from the synergies of the combination, irrespective of whether other assets or liabilities of the acquiree are assigned to those units or groups of units". Those companies and the value of their goodwill, deemed non-compliant can be view at Appendix B. In total, RM7,483 million in goodwill was not allocated to CGUs. This represents approximately 23.98% of the combined goodwill of the top 34 companies. 15 One of these firms, Kumpulan Guthrie Berhad, audited by Ernst and Young, had stated in the notes that goodwill had been allocated to nineteen CGUs. However, they failed to disclose in the notes to accounts the total value of goodwill been which had been allocated to each of the nineteen CGUs, even though they had recognized impairment losses during the reporting period. 16 See FRS 136 paragraph 134.
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One of the PWC"s clients, Genting Berhad, had recognized an impairment loss in the income statement without any allocation of goodwill to a CGU. Other than breaching the standard, it shows that the company did not provide sufficient information regarding the basis of impairment testing. elements of their businesses which in reality can and do generate independent streams of cashflows and are subject to internal management reporting.
In these situations, fewer CGUs than required will be defined, with the result that the chance of being forced to recognise impairment losses in weaker elements of the business are reduced. This subverts the requirement that goodwill be rigorously subjected to impairment testing and that the timing of goodwill impairment loss recognition be driven by the underlying economics of each of the independent cashflow streams which comprise the business, rather than by fiat of managerial discretion.
A key frustration in attempting to conduct meaningful analysis of the likelihood that CGU aggregation behaviour has been present among large Malaysian firms reporting subject to IFRS is that the standard of compliance with basic disclosure requirements is so poor. Yet even with the loss of not far off half the potential observations which might feed such an analysis by reason of the total failure to comply with the requirement that CGU identities and allocated goodwill amounts be disclosed, some themes emerge from the data. Tables 6 and 7 set out the results of this testing. Proportion of firms where CGUs < 100% 75% 86% 70% segments or no effective disclosure 18 The companies (and the auditors) that provided no effective disclosure on business segments and CGU allocation were : BPORT (E&Y), BSTEAD (E&Y), BAT (PWC), CCM (KPMG), GENTING (PWC), KNM (KPMG), GUTHRIE (E&Y), MAGNUM (E&Y), MPHB (E&Y), Nestle (KPMG), PACMAS (E&Y), PPBOIL (E&Y), TAANN (KPMG), TIMECOM (KPMG), UEMBLDR (E&Y). As the data makes plain, in those instances where data pertaining to the existence and identity of CGUs is disclosed, the tendency appears to be for fewer rather than more CGUs to be defined. Further, as Table 7 shows, where more CGUs than business segments are defined, the difference is typically marginal, with no instances observed of any circumstances in which more than 1.5 CGUs per segment were defined. Bearing in mind the expectation in the standard that CGUs should be no larger than defined business segments, it appears anomalous to see so many instances where fewer CGUs than segments exist.
Again, the results may have been clouded in consequence of the poor quality of disclosure relating to CGUs, but arguably this is an interesting observation in its own right. As a tentative conclusion, there does appear to be some evidence consistent with the risk of CGU aggregation, but the magnitude of that risk does not appear to vary systematically dependent on audit firm identity.
The final strands of the analysis undertaken relate to discount and growth rate disclosures made by the firms in the sample. Since no firms disclosed that they had made exclusive use of the fair value approach to goodwill impairment testing (see Table 4 , above), no means existed to conclusively exclude any firms in the sample from the requirement to provide disclosures pertaining to discount and growth rates assumed as an element of the impairment testing process. Table 8 contains the results of the discount rate analysis. A theme which emerges in this dataset in common with the others discussed above is the systematically poor quality of disclosures made by firms in relation to the discount dates applied for the purposes of impairment testing. In only 9 of a possible 34 instances did firms particularise discount rates specific to individual CGUs, as required. More frequently they either stipulated a single discount rate for the firm as a whole (without apparent regard to risk variation between CGUs), a range of discount rates (generally not helpful in the context of allowing detailed financial statement user insights into the robustness of the impairment testing process), or simply failed to make any meaningful disclosures at all.
The analysis also revealed the application of a number of unusually low discount rates, the most obvious exemplar of which was the Ernst & Young client which adopted a rate of 4%, though the PWC client which adopted a rate of 5.09% also appeared to test the hard edge of credibility on this matter 20 . Thus in addition to demonstrating poor quality compliance, the data also hints at the adoption of inappropriately low discount rates 21 in certain cases. However, as with prior tabulations, little stands out which would suggest the capacity to confidently find meaningful cross sectional variation explained by audit firm identity.
The final form of analysis undertaken relates to the growth rates disclosed by the firms within the sample. This data is set out in Table 9 , below. Cursory inspection of this data immediately reveals the profound inadequacy of firm growth rate disclosures, with in excess of 60% of the sample firms apparently ignoring the clear requirement of FRS 136 that disclosures relating to growth rate assumptions applied in impairment testing be published. 20 This judgment is proffered on the basis that long run sovereign risk free rates in jurisdictions such as the United States have tended to manifest at levels in excess of 5%, and in Australia, 6%. It therefore appears unusual that discount rates appropriate to risky enterprises in a less developed economic setting should be so low. 21 With the result that the present value of CGU cashflows is overestimated and the likelihood of the recognition of an impairment loss very substantially reduced. Discounted cashflow models used as a basis for valuation typically consist of two components. The first is an explicit forecast period covered by the most recent budgets/forecasts, the second may be thought of as a terminal value component during which some form of constant growth (or steady state) assumption is made in relation to cashflows which emerge into the model from the year after the conclusion of the explicit forecast horizon through to perpetuity.
Number of companies
Under FRS 136, firms are not required to publish details of their growth assumptions during the first of these two stages (that is, the explicit growth forecast horizon) 24 . However, it is necessary for any growth assumptions pertaining to the terminal value component of the model to be made explicit. Thus, the observed growth rate data set out in Table 9 relates to assumptions expressed in relation to growth rates used to extrapolate beyond the budget/forecast period, being the terminal value to perpetuity element of valuation models used by firms.
As will be evident, the mean and median values for assumed growth appear relatively conservative, given that Malaysian long run nominal GDP growth has been in excess of these levels and can likely be expected to remain so. However, it is notable that the explicit forecast horizons embedded in the valuation models of those organisations which made meaningful disclosures tended to be short (no longer than about 5 years). This raises the likelihood that the bulk of model value lies in the terminal value component of the simulation, something generally regarded as risky and as reducing the robustness of the valuation modelling exercise. 22 In determining the recoverable amount, Scomi Group Berhad (SCOMI), a PWC client, indicated that the company will grow at 50% compounded, in perpetuity and justified this on the basis that this assumption stating that "the weighted average growth rate is consistent with the forecast included in industry reports". 23 Ignores the outliers of SCOMI extreme growth rate assumptions. 24 See FRS 136 -Impairment of Assets, paragraph 134 d(iv).
The extreme estimate of growth made by one reporting entity (50% per annum to perpetuity), clearly nonsensical in a mathematical sense, is noteworthy for its inclusion in a set of audited financial statements. Nonetheless, this aside, the better view of the data is that it reveals consistently poor practice irrespective of audit firm identity.
CONCLUSION
In the introductory sections of this paper we postulated that the adoption of new and complex reporting frameworks could represent a disruptive inflexion point which might have the effect of undermining the impact of prior accumulation of technical expertise on the part of financial statement preparers, and auditors. What we could not have envisaged prior to the completion of the analysis we report in section 4 above, is the drastic degree to which the actual financial statement disclosures made by some of Malaysia"s largest, best resourced and sophisticated businesses diverged from those required under FRS 136.
This raises troubling questions. Because of the manner in which we undertook the process of sample selection, the application of FRS 136 was mandatory for all of the firms included in our final research sample. Yet these firms systematically failed to comply with even basic elements of the FRS 136 disclosure framework in relation to goodwill impairment testing. This was so even though all of the reports from which we drew data and upon which we constructed our analysis had been subjected to audit by "big brand" international audit franchises.
As noted in section four, there was no credible evidence in our dataset of meaningful variation in compliance levels or disclosure quality levels among the clients of these high profile firms. In a sense, the results would have been more comforting had such a phenomenon been obvious. The lack of credible evidence of a bad apple in the basket suggests a more worrying phenomenon, a systemic failure on the part of ostensibly highly professional and reputable audit franchises to combat what can at best be described as loose application of the rules by reporting entities.
Arguably, though based on a small sample, the results of this study are informative at a variety of levels. First, they provide greater richness to the audit quality literature by evidencing situations where firms the quality of whose services have generally been assumed to be high show signs of strain. Second, our results are consistent with those of researchers such as Libby et al. (2006) , who suggest that the level of attention to detail on the part of auditors is materially lower in the context of note form disclosures than in relation to recognised primary financial statement items.
Given the substantial volume of information included in note form disclosures, the tendency of this form of information dissemination to increase rather than atrophy over time and the well known admonition familiar to any financial statement reader that the profit & loss and balance sheet must be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes, this form of evidence is troubling. It may suggest that future research into the domain of audit and audit quality pay closer attention to the potentially rich and policy useful vein of data available in this alternative domain. Third, our results would appear to raise questions about the robustness of regulatory oversight institutions operating within Malaysia, as well as the standard setting process itself. By definition, the objective of financial reporting standards is to achieve the maximum possible harmony and minimum possible variation in practice among reporting entities. Yet the distinctly poor compliance levels we observed in relation to FRS 136 disclosures shows that this result has not been achieved in Malaysia, at least with respect to the first year of adoption.
If reporting entities and their auditors are not willing (or capable -we cannot tell which) to apply clear black letter disclosure requirements stipulated under a mandatory standard, and no other force operates to quickly enforce appropriate practice serious questions must be raised about the integrity of reporting within a jurisdiction and the robustness of decisions made by investors in reliance of reported financial data. If capacity rather than will is the decisive factor, this may represent a signal to standard setters that the limits of what is technically feasible from a reporting and measurement perspective have begun to be tested.
Finally, we would contend that our results ought provide encouragement and stimulation to other researchers interested in the fields of endeavour our piece touches on. It would clearly be desirable to expand the sample, something which only the passage of time will allow in meaningful quantities. It also seems pertinent to ponder whether anything particular to Malaysia dominated the results we uncovered, or whether the types of disclosure and compliance difficulties we encountered cross jurisdictional boundaries.
